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Inthiswork,ProbabilisticSafetyAssessment(PSA)isusedtoevaluateAllowedOutageTimes(AOT)andSurveillanceTestIntervals
(STI) extensions for three Angra 1 nuclear power plant safety systems. The interest in such an analysis lies on the fact that
PSA comprises a risk-based tool for safety evaluation and has been increasingly applied to support both the regulatory and the
operational decision-making processes. Regarding Angra 1, among other applications, PSA is meant to be an additional method
that can be used by the utility to justify Technical Speciﬁcation relaxation to the Brazilian regulatory body. The risk measure used
in this work is the Core Damage Frequency, obtained from the Angra 1 Level 1 PSA study. AOT and STI extensions are evaluated
for the Safety Injection, Service Water and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems using the SAPHIRE code. In order to compensate for the
riskincreasecausedbytheextensions,compensatorymeasuresas(1)testofredundanttrainpriortoenteringmaintenanceand(2)
staggered test strategy are proposed. Results have shown that the proposed AOT extensions are acceptable for two of the systems
with the implementation of compensatory measures whereas STI extensions are acceptable for all three systems.
1.Introduction
Traditionally, Technical Speciﬁcations (TS) such as limiting
conditions of operation, which include system/component
AOT and STI, have been established based only on deter-
ministic analysis [1, 2] and engineering judgment [2].
However, the experience with plant operation indicates that
some elements of the requirements may be unnecessarily
restrictive, and a few may not be conducive to safety [2],
stressing the need to review them based on probabilistic
models capable of assessing the incremental risks associated
with their modiﬁcations.
In the last decades, PSAs have been elaborated and used
not only to support risk-informed regulation but also to
evaluate new plant designs, among other applications. Due
to its broad modeling capability, which includes system
functions and common-cause failure events (CCF), PSA is
especially suitable for the analysis of TS modiﬁcations. Risk-
based methods to improve TS requirements are meant to
(1) evaluate the risk impact of TS modiﬁcations in such a
way as to objectively justify them and (2) provide risk-based
information for the regulatory decision-making process [1].
This work presents an evaluation of AOT and STI exten-
sions for three Angra 1 safety systems [3] through the use
of its PSA Level 1 study, namely (1) Safety Injection System
(SIS), (2) Service Water System (SWS), and (3) Auxiliary
Feedwater System (AFWS). The SIS is a two-train standby
system; the SWS is a two-train system but with three pumps
(oneofwhichisaswing)whereonepumpisinserviceduring
normal operation and the other two are in standby mode,
and the AFWS is a standby system with two motor-operated
pumps plus a turbine-driven pump as diversity. They were
chosen to cover the types of typical safety systems of a
Westinghouse two-loop PWR design. The calculations are
carried out by means of the SAPHIRE code [4] with Angra
1 PSA data as the baseline input. The development of Angra
1 PSA resulted in an average estimation for the Core Damage
Frequency (CDF) value of 4.015E − 05 per reactor-year,
originated from internal events and including the external
event ﬂood, although typically Level 1 PSAs evaluate the core2 International Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability
Table 1: AOT and STI proposed extensions.
System AOT STI
Safety injection system (SIS) 24 hours → 168 hours 1 month → 3m o n t h s
Service water system (SWS) 48 hours → 168 hours 1 month → 3m o n t h s
Auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) 48 hours → 168 hours 1 month → 3m o n t h s
damage frequency by considering only internal accident
scenarios [5]. The proposed extensions are shown in Table 1.
At ﬁrst, the analyses of the AOT and STI extensions are
carried out separately. However, at the end of the study,
simultaneous analyses of TS modiﬁcations for two systems
are also evaluated. Nevertheless, contributions to risk
originated by interactions between AOT and STI are out of
the scope of this work.
The risk measure adopted in this work is the CDF that
can be obtained from a PSA Level 1, as part of its results.
TS modiﬁcations resulting in small risk increments, that is,
increments smaller than 1.0E − 06/reactor-year, are consid-
ered acceptable whenever the related CDF is less than 1.0E −
04/reactor-year. However, for CDF increments greater than
1.0E − 06/reactor-year, the acceptability of TS modiﬁcations
depends on an evaluation process that should be performed
inaccordancewiththeapplicablesafetycriteria.Inthiswork,
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety cri-
teria for TS risk-based evaluation are adopted [6]. As part of
thisstud y ,tw otypesofc ompensat orymeasur esar epr o posed
to compensate for risk increments associated with TS modi-
ﬁcations: (1) test of the system redundant component, right
before entering the AOT and (2) modiﬁcation of the current
test strategy from sequential to staggered, when applicable.
We present in the following a discussion of the state of
the art of the subject, concerning the use of probabilistic
approaches for the discussion of allowable outage time and
surveillance test interval extensions.
Reference [7] presents results of studies of interactions
between AOT and STI. The quantiﬁcation of the interactions
is developed in terms of risk, through the use of PSA
methods. For such, an approach for modiﬁcations of AOT
and STI and their eﬀects in risk is used, taking into account
the interactions between the two parameters. The work is
divided into several steps and aims to present approaches
that can encompass risk measures from the component level
to the CDF risk level. However, the study presented in
this paper concentrates the analysis only in the component
level. According to its conclusions, it would be necessary to
include a system-level approach or above CDF in order to
make it possible to include test strategies and common-cause
failures.Forsuch,theauthorsdevelopedanalgorithmtodeal
with interactions between AOT and STI.
The methodological approach presented in [8] includes
the calculation of the risk impact of a TS modiﬁcation
proposal, through the use of PSA. The calculations had been
developed for the Seabrook and south Texas plants. The risk
measures used for carrying out the study are the system’s
unavailabilitiesandtheCDF.Theacceptancecriteriaadopted
in the study approve changes whose modiﬁcations in the risk
do not exceed 10%. The diﬀerence between this approach
and our work lies mainly in the adoption, in the latter,
of compensatory measures to neutralize the risk impact
increase associated to the TS modiﬁcation.
Reference [9] deals with the comparison between the
risk increase associated with AOT extension and the risk
associated with plant shutdown. Examples are shown for the
Residual Heat Removal and Service Water systems of a BWR.
The study suggests the use of the compensatory measure and
test of the redundant train, for the decision-making process
between continued operation with AOT extension and plant
shutdown.
Reference [10] discusses the interactions between AOT
andSTintervalrequirementsbyusingprobabilisticmethods.
The proposed methodology encompasses (a) the deﬁnition
of AOT and STI interactions; (b) their quantiﬁcation in
terms of risk using PSA methods; (c) an approach for
evaluating simultaneous AOT and STI modiﬁcations; (d)
an assessment of strategies for giving ﬂexibility to plant
operation through simultaneous changes on AOT and STI
using tradeoﬀ-based risk criteria.
Reference [11] deals with STI optimization based on
PSA methods. The approach is divided into three levels:
component, system, and plant. The study concentrates on
the system level application that, according to the authors,
has presented results that diﬀer from the existing technical
speciﬁcation STI requirements. Sequential and staggered
testing strategies are used. Test strategies are introduced
through the development of fault trees that include several
time-dependentvariablesrelatednotonlytothetestinterval,
but also to the repair time and duration of the test. The cited
work uses PSA methods and Markov processes [12]t om o d e l
dependences in the component and system levels.
Reference [13] presents an analysis of time-dependent
unavailabilities of periodically tested components under
varioustestandrepairpoliciesinwhichcomponentrenewals
may eventually take place. Cost functions are developed
under three diﬀerent preventive maintenance policies,
including test, maintenance, repair, and accident costs. The
roles of diﬀerent costs and aging parameters are explicitly
obtained for several models, mainly in the case of an
extended Weibull failure rate.
Reference [14] presents a section dedicated to technical
speciﬁcations in respect of limiting conditions of operation,
requirements of tests, and the use of PSA to present the
concepts for the evaluation of what would be “optimum,”
in terms of AOT and STI associated risk. The work cites
the use of PSA related to the treatment of common-cause
failures. It also emphasizes the relevance to distinguish the
single-event AOT from the cumulative AOT (for example,
yearly AOT). The paper also evaluates the risk associated
with the STI variations and the test-limit risk. The workInternational Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability 3
presents a calculation proposal of AOT extensions and their
comparison with the acceptance risk criteria. The adoption
of compensatory measures to compensate possible risk
increases is not included in the work.
Reference [15] uses a method for evaluating the risk
associated with AOT for several plant conﬁgurations, based
on risk measures. The risks associated with various plant
conﬁgurations considered in the study are compared with
an adopted risk criterion, and the results obtained for the
various proposed conﬁgurations are compared among each
other. However, a methodology of compensatory measures
is not introduced for conﬁgurations that include AOT exten-
sions,whenriskexceedstheacceptableones,accordingtothe
criterion.
Reference [16] presents a proposal of simultaneous
optimization of parameters related to risk-based test and
maintenance and functions of cost, modeled through genetic
algorithms in the system level. The work presents an
example of application of the methodology for the high-
pressure injection system. The results present values of costs
and unavailabilities of valves and pumps, establishing a
correspondence with test intervals and periods of preventive
maintenance for the same valves and pumps.
Reference [17] proposes a new method for explicit
modeling of single-component failure event within multiple
common-cause failure groups simultaneously. This method
is based on a modiﬁcation of the frequently utilized beta
factor parametric model. The motivation for developing this
method lays in the fact that one of the most widespread
softwares for fault tree and event tree modeling as part
of the probabilistic safety assessment do not comprise the
optionforsimultaneousassignmentofsingle-failureeventto
multiple common-cause failure groups.
Reference [18] deals with common-cause failure prob-
abilities in fault-tree analyses including testing and time
dependencies of standby safety systems. Modeling and quan-
tiﬁcation of common-cause failures of redundant standby
safety systems can be implemented by implicit or explicit
fault-tree techniques. The paper derives common-cause
event probabilities for both methods for systems with time-
related CCFs modeled through generic multiple failure rates.
The impact of test interval periods and test staggering
strategy are included. An economic model provides insights
into the impacts of various parameters: the optimal test
intervalincreaseswiththeincreaseinredundancyandtesting
cost and decreases with the increase of accident cost and
initiating event rates. Staggered testing with additional tests
allows the estimation of the longest optimal test intervals.
As part of a risk-informed reviewing of technical spec-
iﬁcations, [19] considers a method for determining risk-
balanced allowed outage times for a VVER440 plant. The
method was tentatively applied to the emergency core cool-
ing system including accumulators, low-pressure injection,
and recirculation. Two diﬀerent risk measures are interesting
in studying AOTs: the AOT single event risk and the
average yearly risk [2]. Both are required to stay within
predetermined criteria. The longest outage time that satisﬁes
both constraints has been established as the risk-based AOT.
Reference [20] presents the development and application
of a multiple objective genetic algorithm to perform the
simultaneous optimization of periodic test intervals (TI) and
test strategies, both included in test planning (TP). Lessons
learned from the high pressure injection system results
show that the double-loop multiple-objective evolutionary
algorithm is able to ﬁnd the Pareto set of solutions.
Reference [21] presents a proposal of maintenance risk
managementthroughthedevelopmentofapilotstudywhich
evaluates the risk of the plant during maintenance activities,
using PSA methods. The article presents a modeling for
common-cause failures, without, however, presenting an
application for extensions of AOT and STI. The scope of the
mentioned work includes a discussion of risk monitor, PSA
modeling, risk measures, and acceptance criteria as well as
the role of regulatory bodies.
Reference [1] discusses a method for risk-informed opti-
mization of allowed outage times to be used in the reviewing
process of technical speciﬁcations of a Finnish VVER440
nuclear plant. The method takes into account realistic com-
ponent repair times and their changes with AOTs, the
possibility of common-cause failures and the risk increase in
extended power operation versus forced shutdown. The
method has been used to review the AOTs of the plant
emergency core-cooling pumps. The results suggest that the
AOTs of single failures could be shortened, while the AOTs of
CCFs should be changed from immediate shutdown to three
days to repair. Shutdown risks and the possibility of CCFs
w e r ef o u n dt oh a v eam a j o re ﬀect on optimal AOTs.
Reference [22] presents the analysis of surveillance test
interval by Markov processes for shutdown systems in
CANDU nuclear power plants. In order to comply with
regulatory requirements, the system availability is evaluated
taking into account component failure rate data and the
beneﬁts of the tests. There are many factors that should
be considered in determining the surveillance test intervals
for shutdown systems, and these include the desired target
availability, the actual availability, the probability of spurious
trips,thetestduration,andtheadverseeﬀectsoftesting,such
as wearout, introduction of human errors, and additional
costs. The paper uses a Markov model to quantify the eﬀect
of surveillance test duration and interval on the system
unavailability and spurious trip probability. The model can
also be used to analyze the variation of CDF in respect
of changes in the test interval once combined with the
conditional core damage model derived from event trees and
fault trees of the plant PSA.
In order to calculate the risk impact caused by testing
and maintenance (AOT and STI) by means of PSA, several
eﬀorts have been carried out internationally. Component
and system level evaluations were found in the literature,
among which only a few have chosen CDF as a risk measure.
Some of the reviewed works emphasize the evaluation
of interactions between the contributions of testing and
maintenance. Other studies have focused on comparing
the risk of plant shutdown with the risk associated with
continued operation after the expiry of the AOT and STI
limits. To compensate the risk increase, these works suggest
the use of compensatory measures as for example, the test of4 International Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability
the redundant train before starting maintenance activities.
Works that use genetic algorithms for optimization of TS
considering cost-related parameters have also been found in
the literature.
The originality of our work lies in the proposed PSA
modeling to reﬂect the use of compensatory measures,
namelytestoftheredundanttrainand/ormodiﬁcationofthe
testing strategy from sequential to staggered to compensate
the increase in risk caused by AOT and STI extensions.
For that purpose, a speciﬁc methodology was developed
to ﬁt the fault simulation (or Corrective Maintenance (CM))
of system trains, whose redundancies are aﬀected in what
concernsthecalculationofcommon-causefailures[23].This
methodology includes not only the simulation of the test of
the redundant train, but also the treatment of the related
common-causefailures,whichmustbechangedtodepictthe
newly tested train condition. Furthermore, the STI extension
is also modeled, as well as the compensation for the possible
introduced increase in risk, by means of modeling eﬀects
in risk when the test strategy is switched from sequential
to staggered, in case it is feasible. The calculations were
performed using the SAPHIRE computer code [4], taking
the Angra 1 PSA as the input data. The SAPHIRE code, used
by the NRC, was adopted by both Angra 1 utility and the
regulatory body as a tool for calculating Angra 1 PSA, which
justiﬁes its use in our work.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 addresses
the risk impact by considering both the AOT and STI
contributions to the total CDF. Common-cause failures
are treated in this context in Section 3. Initially, a 1-out-
of-3:G system is analyzed and then the same analysis is
detailedforatwo-componentsystem.Next,theAOTandSTI
modeling are discussed in Section 4 and, ﬁnally, Section 5
details the compensatory measures that are used, which are
related to the test of the redundant train, as well as to the
staggered and sequential test strategies. Section 6 deals with
the results obtained, by ﬁrst discussing the current technical
speciﬁcationsforAngra1andthenpresentingthesystemcal-
culation results. Overall conclusions and recommendations
are presented in Section 7.
2. Risk Impact
2.1. AOT Risk Impact. It is well known that component
unavailability is associated with risk increase and can occur
either due to Corrective Maintenance (CM) or Preventive
Maintenance(PM).ThisworkdealsonlywiththeCMtypeof
component unavailability. The AOT of a component under
maintenance is established in such a way as to provide
enough time to repair it without incurring in undue risk.
In order to evaluate the risk associated with the AOT, the
following aspects should be considered:
(i) risk increase;
(ii) duration;
(iii) frequency of occurrence.
Based on these aspects, three types of risk impacts associ-
ated with the AOT should be controlled: (1) CDF increment,
(2) the single AOT risk impact, and (3) the yearly AOT risk
impact.
The single-event risk (r) is a function of both CDF incre-
ment and duration (d) of the component unavailability. The
single event risk can be expressed by [2]
r = (CDF1 −CDFB) · d, (1)
where CDF1 is the risk level when the component is known
to be down or unavailable, and CDFB is the baseline risk,
obtained from the PSA level 1 analysis.
The yearly AOT risk (R) is deﬁned as the single event risk
multiplied by the frequency of occurrence (f)
R = f ·(CDF1 −CDFB) ·d. (2)
The literature on risk analysis [5] presents the treatment
of the calculation of single event and yearly average AOT
contributions, when compared with the acceptance criteria
r ≤ rc d ≤
rc
ΔR
R ≤ Rc d ≤
Rc
ΔR · f
Criterion d ≤ min
  rc
ΔR
;
Rc
ΔR · f
 
,
(3)
where rc = single event risk criterion, Rc= yearly risk crite-
rion.
When it comes to AOT extension, both risk-type
contributions must be evaluated. Whether the annual
frequency of a component entering an AOT is greater than
one, the yearly risk contribution will be also greater than
the single-event contribution. However, this is more likely
to happen when dealing with PM, which is associated with
a programmed maintenance schedule. On the contrary,
regarding CM assessment, the frequency of occurrence of
unscheduled maintenances is expected to be close to the
component failure rate, which is much lesser than one.
According to the NRC risk criteria, the single-component
eventrisk(rc)shouldnotbegreaterthan5.0E−07/reactor-yr
andthereisnoestablishedcriteriafortheyearlyaveragedrisk
(Rc)[ 24] .A st h i sw o r ka i m st oa n a l y z ec o m p o n e n tf a i l u r e ,
which leads to a corrective maintenance, the single-event
criteria is applied.
2.2. STI Risk Impact. The risk contribution associated with
thecomponenttestintervalismostlyrelatedtothepossibility
that the component fails during the period between two
consecutive tests. Since the components under consideration
belong to standby safety systems, component failures are
understood as standby time-related failures. An exemption
liesonpumpAoftheSWS,whichisinserviceduringnormal
operation. For calculation purposes, we consider the three
pumps of this system belonging to the same common-cause
group.
If the test is eﬃcient, the component failure probability
(Q) drops to zero immediately after the test and starts to
increase as a function of time. The average unavailability
of a periodically tested component is a function of bothInternational Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability 5
the failure rate (λ) and the test interval time (T)a n dc a nb e
expressed by [2]
Q ≈
1
2
λT. (4)
The increase in CDF associated with the test interval
extension is
ΔCDF = CDFESTI − CDFB, (5)
where CDFESTI is the CDF taking into account the extended
test interval.
3. Treatment of Common-Cause Failures
In Angra-1 PSA, the treatment of common-cause failures is
carried out by means of the Multiple Greek Letters (MGL)
Model [5], which is considered the most general extension
of the Beta Factor Model. In order to simulate the failure
of one component in an m-component system, it is useful
to utilize the Basic Parameter Model [25]. The concepts
underlying this model and its relation with the MGL
model are summarized below. Consider a common-cause
group consisting of three identical components A, B,a n d
C. Deﬁning event XI as the single independent failure
of component X,C XY as the common-cause failure of
components X and Y (and not Z), and CXYZ as the common
cause failure of components X, Y,a n dZ, then the total
failure of component X can be expressed by
XT = XI ∪CXY ∪CXZ ∪CXYZ. (6)
Also, if
Q1 = P[XI] = failure probability of component X
from independent causes,
Q2 = P[CXY] = common-cause failure probability of
components X and Y (and not Z),
Q3 = P[CXYZ] = common-cause failure probability
of components X, Y,a n dZ, and since the events are
mutually exclusive, then
QT = P[XT] = Q1 +2 Q2 +Q3. (7)
Similarly, for a two-component system the total failure of
X is expressed by
QT = Q1 +Q2. (8)
The MGL general equation that expresses the common-
cause failure probability among k particular components
belonging to a common-cause group with m components,
Qk,i s[ 5]
Q
(m)
k =
1  
m−1
k−1
 
⎛
⎝
k  
i=1
ρi
⎞
⎠ 
1 −ρk+1
 
QT, (9)
where 1 ≤ k ≤ m, ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = β, ρ3 = γ, ρ4 = δ,...,ρm+1 =
0, and QT is the component total failure probability. It can
be seen that (7)a n d( 8) are readily obtained from equation
(9). Moreover, for the case of a two-component system, the
MGL Model is reduced to the Beta Factor Model, a widely
used model for common-cause analysis based on a single
parameter (β), in addition to the component total failure
probability. The Beta Factor Model for a two-component
common-cause group is expressed by
Q
(2)
k =
   
1 −β
 
·QT k = 1
β ·QT k = 2. (10)
3.1. Failure Probability of a Three-Component System. A
1-out-of-3:G system is considered failed when all three
components have failed. For that case, neglecting cut sets of
type {CAB,CAC} as explained in [25], the expanded fault tree
can be represented by
{AI,BI,CI};{AI,CBC};
 
BI,CAC
 
;{CI,CAB};{CABC}. (11)
The system (S) failure probability S = AT ∩BT ∩CT will
be then
QS = P[S] = Q3
1 +3Q1Q2 +Q3. (12)
For a three-component system, the conditional failure
probability, given that component A has failed, can be ex-
pressed by
P
 
S
AT
 
=
P[AT ∩BT ∩ CT]
P[AT]
=
QS
QT
. (13)
Developing the conditional probabilities for the addition
of the minimal cut sets, one can obtain the expression for the
Basic Parameter Model:
QS
QT
= Q2
1
Q1
QT
+2 Q1
Q2
QT
+Q2
Q1
QT
+
Q3
QT
. (14)
For practical considerations, taking into account that we
are considering a 1-out-of-3:G logic, and using the approx-
imation Q1 ≈ QT, then (14)r e d u c e st o
QS
QT
≈ Q2
1 +3 Q2 +
Q3
QT
. (15)
Next, by using Q2 = (1/2)β(1 − γ)QT and Q3 = βγQT,
then (15)b e c o m e s
QS
QT
≈ Q2
1 +
3
2
β
 
1 −γ
 
QT +βγ. (16)
Applying (16) for Angra 1 SWS, considering the adopted
values for β = 0.02, γ = 0.63, and assuming Q1 and QT <
10
−3, it is reasonable to consider the approximation
QS
QT
≈ βγ, (17)
where QS/QT represents the system failure given one com-
ponent has failed and βγ represents the common-cause
failures. A detailed discussion on this subject can be found
in Appendix E of [25].6 International Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability
Table 2: Modiﬁcations on pump probabilities to simulate CM.
System/pump Modiﬁcation of independent failures Modiﬁcation of common-cause failures
SIS—train A pump
QFS → 1( t r u e )( Q
(2)
1 )
QCC → β (Q
(2)
2 ) QFR → 1 (true)
QMA → 1 (true)
SWS—train A pump QFR → 1( t r u e )( Q
(3)
1 )
QCCABC → βγ (Q
(3)
3 )
QCCAB → 0( Q
(3)
2 )
QCCAC → 0( Q
(3)
2 )
QCCBC → 0( Q
(3)
2 )
AFWS—train A motor-operated pump
QFS → 1( t r u e )( Q
(2)
1 )
QCC → β (Q
(2)
2 ) QFR → 1 (true)
QMA → 1 (true)
QFS stands for the pump A failure to start probabilities, QFR stands for the pump A failure to run probabilities, and QMA stands for the pump A unavailability
due to maintenance.
3.2. Failure Probability of a Two-Component System. Simi-
larly, considering a 1-out-of-2:G system comprised by com-
ponents A and B, the system conditional failure probability,
given component A has failed, can be expressed by
P
 
S
AT
 
=
P[AT ∩BT]
P[AT]
=
QS
QT
. (18)
Equation (18) can also be expressed as the sum of the
minimum cut sets, which results in
QS
QT
=
Q2
1
QT
+
Q2
QT
. (19)
Forpracticalconsiderations Q1 ≈ QT and(19)isreduced
to
QS
QT
≈ Q1 +β. (20)
4. AOT and STI ExtensionModeling
4.1. Current Technical Speciﬁcations. The technical speciﬁca-
tions taken into account in this work are part of the Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [3]. It is worth mentioning
that Angra 1 is a two-loop plant, where most of the systems
are typically a two-train type, that is, with two pumps, one
in each train. An example of that is the SIS whose pumps are
submittedto24-hourallowedoutagetimeincaseoffailureof
one of them. Despite that fact, exemptions of system designs
are also treated in this work as the SWS and the AFWS.
The SWS is a two-train system with a third swing pump,
all belonging to the same common-cause group. However,
onepumpmustbeoperatingduringnormalplantoperation.
The SWS allowed outage time, given that one pump is failed,
is48hours.Inthissystemonepumpissuﬃcientforthepost-
accident core-cooling operation.
The AFWS comprises two motor-operated pumps and
one turbine-driven pump. However, only the two motor-
operated pumps belong to the same common-cause group,
being the turbine-driven diversity of the system. Therefore,
for common-cause evaluation only the motor-operated
pumps are taken into account. The allowed outage time for
loss of one motor-operated pump is 48 hours.
The SIS, SWS, and AFWS surveillance test intervals are
one month. Concerning test strategy, the three SWS pumps
are tested sequentially while the SIS and AFWS surveillance
tests are staggered. Therefore, in order to compensate risk,
the only candidate system to a test strategy modiﬁcation to
the staggered type is the SWS.
It should be mentioned that the SIS, SWS, and AFWS
pump tests are performed on-line. This means that at any-
time they might be demanded, they will be ready to operate.
4.2. AOT Extension Modeling. AOT extensions, for each
one of the mentioned systems, are analyzed assuming a
CM or a train failure in the corresponding system. By
doing this, a component failure is simulated by setting
its independent failure probability to one (or true) in the
SAPHIRE code, and common-cause failures are treated
according to (15)o r( 20). Since the pumps are the most
important components concerning TS in the safety systems
here analyzed, the extension proposals are only applied to
them. Table 2 shows the modiﬁcations tobe implemented on
thepumpprobabilities,includingthecommon-causefailures
of the SIS, SWS, and AFWS to simulate CM, according to
themethodologypreviouslydescribed.Itcanbenoticedthat,
since during normal plant operation the SWS has one train
in service, the analysis of that in-service train failure implies
setting the pump failure-to-run probability equal to 1 (true).
For the other systems, Q1 from (20) is a combination of the
pump independent unavailability modes (i.e., maintenance
andfailure-to-startandfailure-to-runmodes).Moreover,for
common-cause analysis purposes, the AFWS is considered a
two-train system, as explained before.
4.3. STI Extension Modeling. In order to reﬂect STI exten-
sions, the calculation of CDFESTI should include modiﬁca-
tions on the pump failure to start and common-cause failure
to start unavailabilities. Therefore, for a two-componentInternational Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability 7
Table 3: Modiﬁcations on pump probabilities to simulate STI extensions as proposed in Table 1.
System/pumps Failure to start Common-cause failure
SIS Q
 
FS → 3 ·QFS (Q
(2)
1 ) Q
 
CCFS → 3 ·QCCFS (Q
(2)
2 )
SWS Q
 
FS → 3 ·QFS (Q
(3)
1 ) Q
 
CCFS → 3 ·QCCFS (Q
(3)
3 )
AFWS Q
 
FS → 3 ·QFS (Q
(2)
1 ) Q
 
CCFS → 3 ·QCCFS (Q
(2)
2 )
Q 
x stands for pump probabilities for the extended time period.
system, the pump unavailabilities can be expressed by (using
(4)a n d( 9) and the approximation Q1 ≈ QT)
Q
(2)
1 ≈
1
2
λTE,
Q
(2)
2 ≈
1
2
βλTE,
(21)
where TE is the extended test interval and β is the common-
cause factor.
Similarly, in case of a three-component system, the
equations expressing the test extension are:
Q
(3)
1 ≈
1
2
·λ ·TE,
Q
(3)
2 ≈
1
4
λ ·β ·
 
1 −γ
 
·TE,
Q
(3)
3 ≈
1
2
λ ·β ·γ ·TE.
(22)
Thus, test interval extensions can be simulated by multi-
plying both the pump failure to start and common-cause
probabilities by an “x” factor that represents the ratio
between the extended test interval and the current one.
Table 3 showsthat,inthiswork,thisfactoris3,sincewewant
to extend the current pumps STI from one to 3 months.
5. Compensatory Measures
When TS modiﬁcation results in small increments in CDF,
compensatory measures can be applied to compensate or
balance the undue risk, in such a way that the value of the
total risk is kept within acceptable levels. In this work, the
compensatory measures applied are (1) test of the redundant
train right before entering the AOT and (2) implementation
ofastaggeredtestingstrategy,ifapplicable,forcompensating
both AOT and STI extensions.
5.1. Test of the Redundant Train. Both the single-event risk
and the yearly risk are increased due to the unavailability of
one train during a certain period of time, d.H o w e v e r ,g i v e n
a component failure, the overall risk can be reduced or com-
pensated if the redundant component is submitted to a new
additional test. The eﬀect of this test is to lower the unavail-
ability of the tested component, which is considered to be
zero right after the test is performed. Then, the risk associ-
ated with the tested component starts again to increase until
the next test is performed or the component is demanded.
Equation (4) shows how the unavailability of a tested
component behaves in terms of its test interval, T.I tm e a n s
that, in case of a new additional test right before entering
the AOT period, T can be replaced by dAOT,w h e r edAOT
stands for the extended duration of the failed component
unavailability. Based on that, the redundant component
failure to start unavailability can be expressed by
QFS ≈
1
2
λ ·dAOT. (23)
Inaddition,common-causefailuresofthetestedtrainshould
be replaced by
Q
(2)
CCFS ≈
1
2
β ·λ ·dAOT, (24)
where Q
(2)
CCFS is the probability of common-cause failure to
start of a two-component system, β is the beta factor for
starting failures related to standby components, and we have
made the approximation QT ≈ QFS in (9). It should be
stressed here that 0 <d≤ dAOT, in general, where d has been
used in (1)a n d( 2)[ 2].
Actually, the only 3-pump system treated in this work
is the SWS. This system has a particularity of being a 2-
train system, but with an extra swing pump. During normal
operation, one of the pumps must be running, which means
that the new additional testing on standby pumps can only
be applied to 2 pumps.
In addition to the Technical Speciﬁcations surveillance
requirements that include test intervals, a new additional test
can be performed to the redundant component, right after a
component is considered failed, as a compensatory measure
to the total risk. This extra test should be carried out right
before entering AOT and not before AOT expires. The idea is
toconsidertheredundant component “asgoodasnew”right
after this additional new test.
Table 4 shows the conditions used in simulating the test
of the redundant pump. The unavailability of the tested
component in this case is divided by four, to reﬂect the
reductioninthepumptestinterval,fromtheoriginal4weeks
to the duration of the AOT (168 hours).
5.2. Staggered versus Sequential Test Strategies. Normally, TS
is not prescriptive with respect to the test strategy to be
adopted by the utility for the plant safety systems. However,
when two redundant pumps are sequentially tested, the
probability of introducing the same type of human error
in both pumps increases when compared to the staggered
testing strategy. The advantage in adopting staggered testing
is to reduce the number of failures caused by human errors
during the test performance. Consequently, the common-
cause failure probabilities are reduced when the test strategy8 International Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability
Table 4: Test of the redundant train pump.
Test of the redundant
train pump
Pump A: commence
of AOT
Pump B: test is
performed right
before entering AOT
Pump C: test is
performed right
before entering AOT
Modiﬁcations on
pump common-cause
failure to start
probabilities
Two- or
three-component
system
QFS → 1 (true)
Q
 
FS = QFS/4
QMA → 0( f a l s e )
Q
 
FS = QFS/4
QMC → 0( f a l s e ) Q
 
CCFS = QCCFS/4 QFR → 1 (true)
QMA → 1 (true)
Table 5: Modiﬁcation of pump probabilities to simulate staggered testing strategy.
System Modiﬁcation of common-cause failure to start probability to reﬂect staggered testing
SIS—Pumps A and B Q
 
CCFS = 1/2 ·QCCFS
SWS—Pumps A and B, or B and C, or A and C Q
 
CCFS = 1/2 ·QCCFS
SWS—Pumps A and B and C Q
 
CCFS = 1/3 ·QCCFS
AFWS—A and B motor-operated pumps Q
 
CCFS = 1/2 ·QCCFS
applied to redundant components is switched from sequen-
tial to staggered testing.
In terms of the Alpha Factor Model, for systems sub-
mitted to sequential test strategy, the common-cause failure
probability among k particular components belonging to a
common-cause group with m components, Q
(m)
k ,i sg i v e nb y
[25]
Q
(m)
k =
k  
m−1
k−1
  α
Seq
k
αt
QT, (25)
where k = 1,2,...,m,a n dαt =
 m
k=1 kα
Seq
k .
For systems submitted to staggered test strategy, on the
other side, Q
(m)
k is given by
Q
(m)
k =
1  
m−1
k−1
 α
Stag
k QT. (26)
Qk in the Basic Parameter model is aﬀected by the testing
strategy adopted, since for staggered testing, the number
of times a group of k components is tested depends on
the response to the failure observed, whereas for sequential
testing all components in the group are tested at each test
episode. This yields the following relation for the staggered
and sequential estimators of Qk [23]:
Q
Stag
k
Q
Seq
k
=
1
k
. (27)
Therefore, as an example, for a two-component system,
when the test strategy is modiﬁed from sequential to
staggered,thecommon-causefailurerelatedtofailuretostart
isreducedbyafactoroftwo.Thiscanbeexplainedbythefact
that staggered tests increase the number of tests “against” the
common-cause failures.
According to (25)a n d( 26), independent failures or Q1
expressions do have diﬀerent calculations depending on the
test strategy. However, in this work, these diﬀerences in test
strategies concerning independent failures were taken into
account in the Angra 1 PSA database.
Table 5 shows the necessary modiﬁcations of pump
common-causefailureprobabilitiestoswitchtheteststrategy
from sequential to staggered testing, when applicable.
6. Results
The calculations were carried out by the SAPHIRE code to
simulate pump AOT and STI extensions for the Angra 1 SIS,
SWS, and AFWS. The results indicate, most of the times, the
need to introduce compensatory measures to bring the risk
within the appropriate acceptance criterion.
Single-event and yearly risk results are presented for the
three systems and their respective pump AOT extensions,
with and without compensatory measures. It should be
noticed that diﬃculties in obtaining Angra 1 speciﬁc data for
pump unavailability due to PM and CM, led to the adoption
of their failure rates as the frequencies for the calculation of
the average yearly risk associated with the AOT extensions.
Considering that in this work only CM contributions are
taken into account and with the pump failure rates being
much less than 1, one can conclude that the single event
AOT is more important than the yearly risk for the AOT risk
acceptance decision-making process.
Regarding the STI extensions, the risk level of the system
considering the extension is compared with the CDF.
According to current TS and operational practices in
Angra 1, the possibility of implementing individual AOT
and STI extensions for the SIS, SWS, and AFWS taking
into account the introduction of compensatory measures is
presented in Table 6. We observe that, since the staggered
testing strategy is already adopted for the SIS and AFWS, this
compensatory measure is not applicable to these systems.
Table 7 presents the SIS results for the analysis of AOT
extension, additional test of the redundant pump, and STI
extension. In this table, single-event and yearly AOT risksInternational Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability 9
Table 6: Possibility of AOT and STI extensions for the SIS, SWS, and AFWS.
System Test strategy is staggered Multiple Greek letters
(MGL)
Compensatory measure: test
of the redundant train
Compensatory measure:
staggered test strategy
SIS Yes β Yes No
SWS No β and γ Yes Yes
AFWS Yes β Yes No
Table 7: SIS results.
rR (yr−1) ΔCDF (yr−1)C D F 1 (yr−1) f (yr−1) d (yr)
(1) 5.0E −07 1.29E −07 2.6E −05 6.6E −05 0.26 1.92E −02
(2) 2.0E −07 5.2E −08 1.0E −05 5.05E −05 0.26 1.92E −02
(3) 2.0E −08 < 1.0E −06 4.017E −05
(1) Analysis of the AOT extension.
(2) Analysis of the test of the redundant train.
(3) Analysis of the STI extension.
Table 8: SWS results.
rR (yr−1) ΔCDF (yr−1)C D F 1 (yr−1) f (yr−1) d (yr)
(1) 3.0E −05 7.4E −06 1.54E −03 1.58E −03 0.25 1.92E −02
(2) 1.0E −06 < 2.6E −06 < 1.0E −05 4.27E −05
(3) 2.0E −07 < 1.0E −06 4.03E −05
(1) Analysis of the AOT extension.
(2) Analysis of the STI extension.
(3) Analysis of staggered testing.
are obtained using a baseline CDFB of 4.015E − 05 per
reactor-year, as calculated by the SAPHIRE code using Angra
1 PSA Level 1 results. Also, the frequency of occurrence of
AOTs appearing in this and the following tables are derived
from the respective pump failure rates [26]. We observe
that the incremental core damage frequency obtained for the
AOT extension, 2.6E − 05/yr, is greater than the acceptance
criterion, despite the single-event contribution obtained for
the extension, 5.0E − 7/yr is equal to the criterion rc.W e
conclude that this extension is not acceptable for the SIS
withoutcompensatorymeasures.Uponthesimulationofthe
redundant train test, both the increment of the CDF and
the single-event contribution diminish, as can be seen in
Table 7.H o w e v e r ,ΔCDF is now equal to 1.0E −05/yr, which
is exactly the boundary of the acceptance criterion. This
means that despite the implementation of the compensatory
measure “test of train B,” just prior to the period of the AOT,
other measures could be considered in risk-based regulatory
decision making, such as the availability of redundant trains
of other safety systems to compensate for this increased risk.
Finally, the result displayed in Table 7 for the STI extension
from one month to three months shows that the value
obtained for the CDF, 2.0E − 08/yr, is acceptable in terms
of risk analysis, according to the criterion without the need
of introduction of compensatory measures.
Table 8 shows the SWS results for the analysis of AOT
extension, STI extension, and introduction of the staggered
testing strategy. One can easily see that the value obtained
for the CDF1 upon the AOT extension, 1.58E − 03/yr, is
greater than the baseline, which indicates the need of a
compensatory measure. Using the method presented in
Table 4 for the test of the redundant train yields a result
of 3.82E − 05/yr for CDF1 (not shown in Table 8) that
characterizes a decrease in CDF which, according to the
criterion, can always be allowed. In other words, the test of
the redundant pump is enough to compensate the increase
in CDF caused by the AOT extension.
The value obtained for the ΔCDF upon the STI exten-
sion, 2.6E − 06/yr, is acceptable according to the criterion,
since Angra 1 CDFB is less than 1.0E − 04/yr. The introduc-
tion of staggered testing can even reduce this risk increment,
as can be seen in Table 8. The value obtained for ΔCDF with
the staggered testing strategy was 2.0E −07/yr.
Table 9 presents the AFWS results for the analysis of AOT
extension, STI extension, additional test of the redundant
motor-operated pump, and additional test of the redundant
motor-operated pump including the turbine-driven pump.
The result of the AOT extension yields a ΔCDF of 3.0E −
04/yr, which is unacceptable without compensatory mea-
sures. Likewise, the simulation of the test of the redundant
motor-operatedpumpisnotenoughtocompensatetheAOT
extension, since both the increase in ΔCDF and the single-
event risk do not meet the established criterion. However,
the introduction of the additional test of the turbine-driven
pump can also be taken as a compensatory measure. The
increase in ΔCDF in this case, which is 2.42E − 04/yr, still
remains unacceptable. Therefore, within the scope of this
work an AOT extension for the AFWS should not be allowed10 International Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability
Table 9: AFWS results.
rR (yr−1) ΔCDF (yr−1)C D F 1 (yr−1) f (yr−1) d (yr)
(1) 5.8E −06 5.1E −06 3.0E −04 3.4E −04 0.88 1.92E −02
(2) 5.0E −06 4.4E −06 2.63E −04 3.03E −04 0.88 1.92E −02
(3) 4.6E −06 4.1E −06 2.42E −04 2.82E −04 0.88 1.92E −02
(4) 1.0E −06 < 1.4E −06 < 1.0E −05 4.15E −05
(1) Analysis of the AOT extension.
(2) Analysis of the test of the redundant motor-operated pump.
(3) Analysis of the test of the redundant motor-operated pump and the turbine-driven pump.
(4) Analysis of the STI extension.
Table 10: Overview of the AOT and STI extensions.
System
AOT extension to 168h
without compensatory
measures
AOT extension to 168h with
compensatory measures
STI extension to 3 months
without compensatory
measures
STI extension to 3 months
with compensatory
measures
SIS No Yes (restrictions applied) Yes (no restrictions) Not applicable
SWS No Yes (no restrictions) Yes (restrictions applied) Yes (no restrictions)
AFWS No No Yes (restrictions applied) Not applicable
Table 11: Results of simultaneous extensions.
rR (yr−1) ΔCFD (yr−1)C D F 1 (yr−1) f (yr−1) d (yr)
(1) 1.6E −07 4.2E −08 8.5E −06 4.86E −05 0.26 1.92E −02
(2) 2.0E −07 4.03E −05
(3) 2.0E −07 5.1E −08 1.0E −05 5.05E −05 0.26 1.92E −02
(1) Simultaneous AOT extensions for SIS and SWS.
(2) Simultaneous STI extensions for SIS and SWS.
(3) Simultaneous AOT and STI extensions (SIS).
underanyconditions.Atlast,theSTIextensionfortheAFWS
can be allowed due to the fact that the ΔCDF increase is
acceptable, as can be seen in Table 9.
An overview of the results of the AOT and STI extensions
are presented in Table 10. The term “no restrictions” in this
table means that the corresponding ΔCDF, as calculated for
theextension,issmallerthan1.0E−06perreactoryear,while
“restrictionsapplied”meansthat1.0E−06 < ΔCDF < 1.0E−
05, when CDFB is less than 1.0E − 04, which is the case of
Angra 1.
Although plant conﬁguration control is not in the scope
of this work, we have analyzed a few combinations of simul-
taneous AOT and STI extensions, based on the overview
of results presented in Table 10. Thus, as a very ﬁrst step
in developing a program for plant conﬁguration control
that allows the establishment of a risk-based planning for
maintenance activities, three combinations of simultaneous
AOT or STI extensions have been calculated. Table 11
presents the results obtained with the SAPHIRE code for
(1) simultaneous AOT extensions for the SIS and SWS;
(2) simultaneous STI extensions for the SIS and SWS
(3) simultaneous AOT and STI extensions for the SIS.
Interactions between AOT and STI extensions have not been
taken into account in this analysis. In what concerns item
(1) of Table 11, the single-event risk r value of 1.6E − 07/yr
is less than the criterion rc value of 5.0E − 07/yr and CDF
lies between 1.0E − 05/yr and 1.0E − 06/yr, which makes
this conﬁguration acceptable for the SIS and SWS AOT
extensions to 168h. For item (2), the increment value of
CDF, 2.0E − 07/yr, indicates that, based on risk analysis,
the simultaneous STI extensions for the SIS and SWS are
acceptable.Finally,regardingitem(3),theriskofsingleevent
(r)v a l u eo f2 .0E − 07/yr is less than the criterion, which
would make this conﬁguration acceptable by this point of
view. However, the calculated ΔCDF of 1.0E −05/yr is in the
limit between acceptance and rejection indicating the need,
in the regulatory decision-making process, to consider other
aspects such as the availability of redundant trains of other
safety systems, to compensate this limiting value of ΔCDF.
7. Conclusions
The results obtained in this work show that AOT and STI
extensions for the SIS, SWS, and AFWS of Angra 1 power
plant are feasible without incurring in unacceptable increase
in the plant total risk, mostly after the implementation of
compensatory measures.
AOTandSTIextensionsforthesesystemsresultindiﬀer-
entimpactsonthetotalCDF.WhileAOTextensionscanonly
beacceptedfortheSISandSWSupontheimplementationof
compensatory measures, STI extensions are acceptable for all
three systems without the need of compensatory measures.
Clearly, in the decision-making process of a TS modiﬁcation,
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from previous TS modiﬁcations, and traditional engineering
judgment are also to be considered, in addition to the risk
analysis performed.
AOTextensionsaremeanttoallowtimeﬂexibilitytoper-
form adequate component maintenance and repair, which
in turn reduces both the AOT frequency and unplanned
plant shutdowns. STI extensions, on the other side, can be
implemented with virtually no signiﬁcant contribution to
CDF, thus substantially reducing an unnecessary burden of
the plant team in carrying out a large number of unnecessary
tests, so that their attention can be concentrated on activities
more relevant to safety. Reducing the number of tests also
reduces the number of occurrences of unplanned plant
shutdowns caused by test-induced transients.
In what concerns TS modiﬁcations, sensitivity analyses
may be necessary to address the role of key assumptions
adopted during the preparation of the study, which act as
a support to uncertainty analysis. Experience on sensitivity
analyses developed for modiﬁcations of risk-based TS shows
that the risk associated with them is relatively insensitive
to uncertainties when compared, for instance, to the eﬀect
on risk from uncertainties in assumptions regarding plant
design changes, or regarding signiﬁcant changes to plant
operatingprocedures[24].Nevertheless,asensitivityanalysis
of the risks associated with the components in question is
recommended. Such an analysis can be done through the
use of risk importance measures that may be relative or
absolute and have the purpose of classifying the signiﬁcance
of components or systems in terms of their contributions to
the overall risk. Importance measures have direct application
to plant conﬁguration control in measuring the signiﬁcance
of the unavailability eﬀect of a single component that has
been isolated for maintenance.
The most utilized importance measures for assessing
nuclear plant components and their main applications are
[5].
(1) Birnbaum is deﬁned as follows. the rate of change in
total risk of the system with respect to changes in
a risk element’s basic probability (or frequency). It
indicates the sensitivity of the minimal cut set upper
bound with respect to a change in the basic event
probability. It is sensitive to the component position
in the fault-tree structure.
(2) Fussell-Vesely is an indication of the fraction of
the minimal cut set upper bound probability (or
sequence frequency) that involves the cut sets con-
taining the basic event of interest. In an aging regime,
it can be interpreted as the amount of a component
allowed degradation of performance as a function of
risk increase. Also shows the importance of the long
term averaged performance of a component (thus, it
is not appropriate for measuring the importance of a
set of similar components instantaneously taken out
of service).
(3) RRW (risk reduction worth) is an indication of
how much the minimal cut set upper bound would
decrease if the basic event never occurred. In other
words it expresses the risk change when the compo-
nent is clearly available.
(4) RAW (risk achievement worth) is an indication of
how much the minimal cut set upper bound would
go up if the basic event always occurred. In other
words, it gives the risk increase when the component
is unavailable for maintenance or due to failure.
At ﬁrst, regarding the changes in TS measured in this
work, the most appropriate measures of importance for the
sensitivity analysis appears to be the RAW and Birnbaum, for
extensions of the AOT and STI, respectively. Nevertheless,
it is recommended here to also consider the Fussell-Vesely
importance measure.
However,newimplicationsonimportancemeasuringare
to be taken into account. New developments and roles of
diﬀerent importance measures have been pointed out [27],
concerning the decision-making process on permanent and
temporary conﬁgurations, technical speciﬁcations, online
risk monitoring, and also ranking safety signiﬁcance of
systems, structures, components, and human actions. A
proposal on the use of path sets, instead of cut sets has been
made [28], which shows that in this manner, importance of
preventing top events is addressed instead.
As earlier mentioned, this work represents an important
step towards plant conﬁguration control, which is designed
to operate in an eﬃcient and eﬀective use of plant resources,
or safety systems. Therefore, and recommended the devel-
opment of a conﬁguration control program in which the
following objectives must be achieved is desirable [29]:
(i) management of the conﬁguration of components
that are simultaneously unavailable;
(ii) management of the standby components that are
operable;
(iii) management of the duration of the conﬁguration
(CFI);
(iv) management of the frequency with which the conﬁg-
uration occurs;
(v) management of AOT and STI interactions [7].
The calculation method presented in this work, which
includes the use of compensatory measures and comparison
with risk criteria, is the basic calculating tool for the
management of the goals presented above. Furthermore,
conﬁguration control strategies involve the control of risk
levels and risk contributions similar to those deﬁned here
and addressed during the development of this study.
Another recommendation is the inclusion of Preventive
Maintenance (PM) in the AOT analysis. In this case, it is
essential to develop a speciﬁc data base of plant operational
experiencethatclearlymakesthedistinctionbetweenthePM
and CM unavailabilities. It is worth mentioning that the col-
lectionofoperationaldatamustbetargetedforPSAuse[30].
The preservation of the defense in-depth principle
and the observation of engineering limitations should be
also emphasized. The quantitative criteria described in the
regulatory guidelines [24, 31] are used to ensure that any12 International Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability
risk increase is within acceptable limits. However, this does
not exclude traditional considerations for the decision-
makingprocess,toensurethatchangescomplywiththerules
and regulations. Practical considerations are an integrated
part of the judgment concerning the acceptability of the
implementation of modiﬁcations.
It is important to address here the issue of PSA itself. PSA
modeling limitations have been long discussed. One issue
recently raised [32] concerns on the wide use of the so-called
fault tree linking method for performing the evaluation of
accident scenario frequencies [33]. This approach relies on
the fact that for each initiating event, all pertinent fault trees
related to the accident sequences are linked through a fault
tree with an AND gate whose cut sets are generated and
analyzed. Reference [33] points out that this may not be
accurate. The example discussed shows that the CDF may be
in error around a factor of 5. The paper proposes the use of
binarydecisiondiagrams(BDD)[34].TheBDDofaformula
is a compact encoding of the truth table of this formula. It
would be interesting to investigate, in this context, the role
of the opposite approach to perform a PSA: the one of large
event trees and small fault trees, known as event trees with
boundary conditions (or explicit method) [32, 35].
Another feature to be considered is the set of PSA trun-
cation limits [36]. According to [37], it should be adequate
to retain the minimal cut sets that contribute 90–99% to the
point estimate CDF. However, a tighter control could be nec-
essary to take into account smaller probability/frequency cut
sets that might have substantially larger uncertainty factors
compared with those that dominate the point estimate CDF
[35].
The issues raised in [32, 33] have a deep inﬂuence on
the discussion of the importance measures to be used, as it
is clearly mentioned in both references.
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